China and US push Southeast Asia over their AI blocs. Will it test region’s non-alignment?

The rivalry is moving beyond traditional security and trade. Washington wants Southeast Asian countries connected to Pax Silica, its proposed China-free artificial intelligence supply chain. Beijing wants them to join the World Artificial Intelligence Cooperation Organisation, known as Waico.

The key difference is control over the network. Pax Silica would link AI production and supply around the United States while excluding China. Waico would create a China-backed framework for cooperation in artificial intelligence. In both cases, membership could shape access to chips, data, software, investment, and technical partnerships.

This puts Southeast Asian governments in a familiar but sharper position. They have long said they will not be forced to choose between the United States and China. The AI contest tests that position because supply chains and cooperation groups can create lasting dependence, even without a formal political alliance.

Pax Silica is the United States’ proposed network for building artificial intelligence without China inside the core supply chain. A supply chain includes the industries and connections needed to design, produce, move, and operate AI systems. Washington wants Southeast Asian countries linked to this network.

The strategic mechanism is exclusion and coordination. By limiting China’s role, the United States could encourage partners to use American-aligned chips, software, investment, and technical standards. This may make it harder for China to access important technology or shape how AI develops across the region. The article describes this as Washington’s bid to build a China-free AI supply chain.

The plan matters because AI depends on many connected inputs. Countries joining could gain access to partners and technology, but their choices could also narrow. Pax Silica therefore turns technical cooperation into a test of Southeast Asia’s ability to remain balanced between Washington and Beijing.

The World Artificial Intelligence Cooperation Organisation, or Waico, is China’s proposed vehicle for international AI cooperation. The article says Beijing wants its neighbors to join it. Unlike Pax Silica, which is described as China-free, Waico would place China at the center of the cooperation framework.

Its basic mechanism would be collective coordination around artificial intelligence. The source does not specify Waico’s final membership rules, institutions, or services. It does show the political purpose: China wants regional countries participating in an AI arrangement that it leads. Such a framework could connect governments through shared projects, standards, investment, or technical exchanges, though the article does not confirm specific programs.

Waico gives Beijing an alternative to the US-led model. For Southeast Asian countries, joining could offer closer cooperation with China while creating questions about dependence and strategic alignment. The organization’s significance will depend on whether governments treat it as practical cooperation or as a signal of political choice.

ASEAN, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, is the main regional grouping discussed in this context. It has 10 member countries: Brunei, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and Vietnam. This membership figure is established background knowledge; the article itself refers broadly to Southeast Asian leaders and neighbors.

ASEAN matters because its members represent a large and diverse regional community. They differ in economic size, technology capacity, diplomatic preferences, and relationships with Washington and Beijing. That diversity makes a single regional response difficult. It also makes the group strategically important to both competing powers.

The AI contest could test ASEAN’s tradition of avoiding forced alignment. Individual members may cooperate with one or both powers in different areas. Yet shared supply chains, standards, and technology networks could gradually pull countries in different directions. The group’s challenge will be preserving room for independent choices while seeking useful AI partnerships.

A US-led or China-led AI network could give Southeast Asian countries practical benefits. These may include better access to chips, software, data partnerships, investment, research, and skilled workers. The article does not list specific membership benefits, but these are common features of technology cooperation. AI links could also help governments build local capabilities.

The mechanism is network access. A country’s partners influence which technologies it can buy, which standards it follows, and whose systems its companies learn to use. A US-led network might connect members to Pax Silica’s China-free supply chain. A China-led network would place them within Waico’s Beijing-centered cooperation structure. These choices can affect costs and future options.

The possible losses are strategic as well as economic. Countries may face pressure to restrict cooperation with the other power. They could become dependent on one supplier or political center. Since Southeast Asian leaders insist they will not pick sides, the AI contest may force difficult trade-offs between immediate gains and long-term autonomy.

Governments can cooperate with both powers without formally joining either side’s exclusive political camp. They could accept US partnerships for some research, training, or supply-chain projects while working with China on other AI applications, investment, or technical exchanges. The source establishes the rivalry, but it does not prescribe a balancing strategy.

The key mechanism would be issue-by-issue cooperation. Countries could set clear procurement rules, protect sensitive data, require transparency, and avoid giving one partner control over every critical system. Regional standards could make cooperation more predictable. Governments could also compare offers rather than granting automatic preference to Washington or Beijing.

This approach would preserve more diplomatic space, but it would be difficult. Pax Silica is explicitly designed as China-free, while Waico is a China-led alternative. Some projects may therefore demand exclusivity. Southeast Asian governments would need to separate commercial cooperation from political alignment and coordinate their positions where possible.

An AI supply chain is the connected system that makes artificial intelligence possible. It includes chip design and manufacturing, computing equipment, data, software, cloud services, research, logistics, and trained specialists. AI is not just an algorithm. It depends on many physical and human inputs working together.

Chips provide the processing power to train and run models. Data helps systems learn. Software turns computing power and data into usable tools. Technical expertise allows countries to design, maintain, secure, and improve those systems. If a government or company controls important links, it can influence access, costs, performance, and standards.

That creates strategic power. Countries with strong supply chains can support domestic industries and reduce vulnerability to foreign restrictions. They can also set rules and build partnerships around their technologies. This explains the US-China contest described in the article: Pax Silica and Waico are competing ways to organize influence over AI’s essential foundations.